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Chapter 8

From Fallibility to Fragility
How the Theory of Narrative Transformed
the Notion of C1taracter of Fallible Man
Pol Vandevelde

Even those who are familiar with Ricoeur's work may wonder how the notion
of character, which was approached in the psychological sense of personal
traits in Fallible Man, could be transfonned into that of a •·narrative charac
ter" in his later wc,;·ks, such that "life" could be spoken of as being "in search
of narratives'' (Riweur 1991 b) or that "the narrative category of character"
could "contribute •. . to the discussion of personal id~ntity.. ( I 992: 143;
1960a: 170). This is what I want 10 examine in this chapter.
Tracing the transformation that took place between Ricoeur's early work,
Fallible Man and his later works, such as Oneself as Another. has two her
meneutic advantages. Prospectively. it shows that the transfonnation from
the phenomenological and psychological notion of character in Fallible Mari
to the narrativist account in his later works resorbs the tensions that Ricoeur
only names in Fallible Man-what he calls the ''disproportion·· between the
finitude of human beings (as manifested by their character) and their aspira
tion to infinity or "happiness.'' Retrospectively. tracing this transfonnation,
first, account$ for the fact that. despite the changell. there is a consistency to
Ricoeur's position and, second. shows how radical the theory of narratives is
when it comes to the notion of character: by giving precedence to the •'who"
qllegtion of those who give the account over the question of ··what" an indi
vidual is, precedence is given to ethics over ontology. I will draw out these
two benneneutic advantages in two sections. First I will examine the notioo
fi character in Fallible Man, and second I will examine how the theory of
lllrrative transforms this notion.
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THE ONTOLOGY OF "DISPROPORTION"
IN FALLIBLE MAN

Tue ··philo. ophy of the will"' addre~t;eS a theme that remains constant in
Ricoeur's thought. up to one of his la,t works. Memory, Hisrory. Forgetting
(2000: 200..Ja): the tensions in human life and human activities. Ln follibfe
Man be borrows Pascars notion of '"disproponion" to name these ten,\ions
(between our finituJe and the infinity of our aspirations). In Time and Narra
rfre he calls it a "heterogeneity" (as the diversity of fact. and event~ happen
ing in the past or in our life). l n Om•se(f as Another he speaks of a ··passivity''
of the self (as body. conscience. and other people). Throughout Ricoeur'~
work, these ten. ions do not stand outside human reach. as if they were forces
oppressing human beings and shaping their existence out ·idc their conscious
ness. Already in Freedom and Nature. despite the fact 1ha1 the will cannot
recover what makes it possible. the involuntary was not an aultlnornou~
force beyond the reach of the will. The same is true in Fallible Man, where
a disproponion is only such from the perspective of a ··synthesis.'' and in
011ese/f as Another. where there is pa~sivity only from the pen,pective of an
··activity.'' ll1at i.~ to say that tbe involuntary. disproponiun, and passi\ily are
Jiscovered by the subject and thus recovered as an other in the subject, a,
an alterity that preceded the subject, and as having an efficacy that need.-, the
~u bject lo iakc its force.
l.n Fallible Man Ricoeur uses Cartesian terms and speaks of ··the Cartesian
paradox of the finite-infinite human being·· ( 1960a: 22: 1986a: ..J: tran),_ mod.).
Everything human is of a finite son and yet human being ... have aspirations or
strivings for something that transcends their finituJe. Thi!> ·•disproportion" is
the experience of an exces ·. of that which transL·end~ their limitations. They
experience a ··11oncoincidence·· with themselves ( 1960a: 21: 1986a: 4).
A~ with Freedom and Nllture, where the "involuntary'" is what chal
lenges or unsettles the voluntary, likewi se in Fallible /111111 Ricoeur pre~ents
the noocoincidence with oneself in negative term~. A, the title of the book
make.. clear, fallibility is intrinsic to the constitution of human beings who
are characterit.ed negatively as capable of failing. 1 This negative dimension
of the disproponion at the ontological level calls for a "restoration" of u~ity
in the form of reconciliation. which Ricoeur calls a "synthesis." As he wntes
in Freedom and Nature. ··the theory of the voluntary and the inrnluntary not
only describes and understands. but al~o restores·· ( 1950: 21: 1966: I8). .
The ··synthesb" that can resorb the disproportion is what is probl~mauc
in Ricor:ur' s view and wh.JI, I argue, motivates him to ahandon hi~ ··psycho
logical" views in Faffible Man and take a narratiw turn in his later w'.ir~
As I will ~how. the synthesi~ cannot work for structural reastin'> becau~e 1115
.
· ..-an d it will have
1 .. cog1to
performed
by tht: subJect-what
R1coeur
cal ls 11e
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to take place at the level of consciousness and thus in the form of a judg
ment. Yet, the synthesis "synthesizes'' precisely that which allegedly cannot
be subsumed under a judgment-the involuntary or fallibility. As we will
see. the theory of narrative displace.s the experience of disproportion from
the ontological structure of the human being and shifts it ICI the ethical stanc.e
they take. Let us "ee the way in which fallibility manifests this tension that
needs reconciliation.
By fallibility, Ricoeur means the ontological possibility of falling and
doing evil, of having a "bad will.'' It is part of the human condition to have the
"capacity [pou voir) of failing'' ( 1960a: I 61; 1986a: 223. trans. mod.), to be
"capable of failing" (1960a: l 61; 1986a: 223 ), or to '"find oneself exposed
to failure [se "trouve expose" afail/ir)" (1960a: 21; 1986a: 4. trans. mod.).
Through this capacity to fail moral evil is possible: '"What do we mean when
we call human beings fallible? Essentially this: that the possibility of moral
evil is inscribed in their constitution" ( 1960a: 149; I 986a: 204: trans. mod.). 2
Fallible Man thus complements the· phenomenology of the will of Freedom
and Nature-an eidetics of the will-and represents for Ricoeur an "outline
of philosophical anthropology'' ( 1960a: I I; 1986a: xix)-in the form of an
"empirics" of the will.
Ricoeur examines three forms of the disproportion that is constitutive of
human beings, thus three forms of their "noncoincidence" with themselves
with regard to knowledge at the theoretical level. actioo at the practical
level. and feeling at the affective kvel. These three "disproportions" also
represent three levels of human ••fragility'' in the sense that they are fallible
in each of these three domains: theoretical , practical. and affective. For
each disproportion there is a corresponding "synthesis." At the first level
of knowledge, the disproportion is betwe.en reaso11 and sensibility, to thi;>
extent that we have a finite perspective on objects and yet claim objectivity.
Ricoeur sees Kant ' s notion of tran scendental imagination as performing a
"synthesis" of the finite perspective in order to provide objectivity. At the
second level of action, there is a disproportion between character and hap
piness to the extent that my character gives me my limited situation and my
dispo itions but I strive for happiness as the completion of all my limited
strivings. The "practical synthesis," which Ricoeur borrows from Kant
&gain, is performed by the respect for persons. as that which mediates my
~haracter and my striving for happiness. At the third level of feeling there
•~ a disproportion between my desires that bind me to the organic aspect_ of
life-bios-and those that lead me to pursue the logos and strive for being
rational. The affective, synthesis mediating desires and aspirations is per
formed by "feeling'' or "heart'' (Plato's rhumos) . l will not discus s the first
Ind third disproponions here. but instead will focus on the second, practical
one • ·mvotving character.
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Character as a Set of Psychological Traits
Against the Sartrean position. Ricoeur maintains that freedom is not abso
lute. but rather it is '"lived" at the practical level through my character. which
represents "the finite manner of freedom" ( I960a: 77; 1986a: 93).' My psy
chological dispositions and inclinations determine my way of being ~ituated
in the world and my limited projects and goals detennine how I envisage
my place in it. Yet, I aspire to happiness. which would be the fulfillment of
my aspirations. Such is the disproportion between my character and happi
ness. Character is described in terms of that which limits human beings. As
"the finite opennes,; of my existence taken as a whole'' ( 1960a: 75: 1986:
89). character is on the side of ''finitude" ( 1960a: 85: 1986: I03) or "contin
gency'' (1960a: 155: 1986a: 212)_ Ricoeur qualifies this finite and contingent
way of being as a ·•narrowness'': "Character is nothing but the narrowne~s
of my access to all values of all human beings across all cultures" I 1960a:
87: 1986a: I08, trans. modi.). While on the side of contingency. character is
not fate in the strong l!ense of a force "which governs me from the out~ide"
( 1960a: 78; 1986a: 94, trans. mod.) but it is fate "in a certain way,'' as Ricoeur
says. and in two re,;pects: ·'as unalterable [immurnh/e ]" and as "received. as
inherited" ( 1960a: 78-79: 1986a: 94 ).
Character is "unalterable" or •'immutable" in the sense that it is not sub
jected to the will as what. for example. I can choose to have. Rather. it is
"the radically non-1.:ho~en origin of all my choices" ( 1960a: 79: 1986a: 95).
Besides being unalterable. it is also ''inherited'' as that which I received at
birth and gave me my situation in the world. In other words. it is the facticiry
of my existence in the chronological and exi~tential sen~e. Chronologically.
my birth is ·'the already-there [le dejd lid of my character" ( I 960a: 80: I 986a:
96, trans. mod.) to the extent that
birth gives my character a precedence
over my will. Existentially. my birth is "nothing other than my character··
( 1960a: 80: 1986.:1: 96). Yet. because this character w,b mine from the
start and made me the subject I am. character is both donation (as gift) and
empowerment (as laking as my own). It is a "gift tdonation] which makes
me heir to my own life theritier de ma propre l'ie ]" ( 1960a: 80: I 986a: 9!)
in the sense that it is from the retrospective move of taking it as my own-m
the position of heir-that the gift is such. In Ricoeur's words. ··the fate of
character and heredity discloses its meaning: it is the given. factual narrow·
nes~ of my free openness to the totality of the possibilities of the being-human
[l'etre-lwmme)" ( 1960a: 81: 1986a: 98).
To the linitutle (narrowness. contingence f of character. Riroeur ~PP?~e~
the infinite counterpart of happinef:s, which is the totality of the a~pirau~ns
we have. He takes from Aristotle the view that the good is that toward wh~ch
all things, actions. and choices strive. Ricoeur then adds 10 this Aristotelian

my
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notion the Kantian sense of a "totality'': all these goods toward which we
strive are subsumed under happiness.*
In the first disproportion at the theore.tical level, the notion of totality was
applied to the objectivity to which knowledge aspires. The transcendental
claim to knowledge (in a Kantian sense) goes beyond the limited perspec
tives we can ever have on an object (e.g .. in perception) and presents a form
of totality of perspectives as the objectivity of knowledge. In a similar way.
Ricoeur argues that at the practical .level of action. regardless of the fact
that we are s.ituated and disposed in specific ways by our character. "we are
'directed toward' happiness" as the totality of sen se and contentment. "Hap
piness ... must be to the totaUty of human aims what the world is to the
aims of perception. Just as the world is the horizon of the thing, happiness
is the horizon in all respects" ( I960a: 82; 1986a: I00, trans. mod.). Ricoeur
characterize · happiness as "the excess of meaning, the overflow [le trop ],
the immense'' ( 1960a: 86: 1986a: 105) or as a "feeling of the 'immense."'
Through excess. "the horizon is clear, unlimi'ted possibilities open up before
me" (1960a: 85; 1986a: 104 ).
Because of the excess of happiness or disproportion between happine ss
and character. a "mediation" analogous to Kant's transcendental imagina
tion at the theoretical level is needed. Just as the transceadental imagination
mediates sensibility and reason in a way that allows for the finite perspective
of the knower to be transcended into objective knowledge, Ricoeur claims
that Kant's notion of "respect" is the practical mediation between character,
as what is specific to me. and happiness, which opens me to the whole of
humanity (1960a: 67; 1986a: 77).
With regard to this notion of respect. I will only point out the role of
"synthesis" that Ricoeur ascribes to it and I will programmatically raise the
questioa of where the synthesis is exercised. Ricoeur does not really answer
thi!i question in Fallible Man other than by appealing to the Kantian ''ideal''
of the person. which R.icoeur calls "humanity." Using this ideal. Ricoeur c..:on5ider an individual to be one instantiarj on of humanity and as such a person
Worthy of "respect." In thi s way. the person as representative of hu.manity is
precisely "a synthesis of happiness and character'' ( 1960a: 86: I 986a: l 05).
However, this only names the problem of reconciling finite perspectives and
infinite totality. It does not solve it. Ricoeur tell s us that the ·'disproportion"
between that which anchors me in a nnite perspective (my character) and that
Which attract· me to go beyond my own finitude (happiness) is not external to
Ille, but "inhabits the human will'' (1960a: 84: 1986a: 103, trans. mod .). Yet,
~ can only describe the effect of disproportion: it distends or tear. apart18 them!'.elves and for themselves. human beings remain torn" ( 1960a: 157:
1986&: 216, trans. mod .). The synthesis is just the suffering of the discord.
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The theory of narrative that he develops later in Time and Narrati1 ·e ( 1983:
1984) and Oneulf os Another offers a more convincing "synthesis."

FROM THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHARACTER
TO THE CHARACTER IN A NARRATIVE

The English word '"character." in its dual meaning as psychological and
narrativist, is titting for characterizing Ricoeur's narrative rum away from
the psychological consideration of character in Fallihle Man---carnctere in
French-toward a narrativist approach in which the self become~ a character
in a plot-un personnage in French. Ricoeur came to realize that the self
comes to a self-understanding through narratives and thus by being embedded
in plots. ·'Understood in narrative terms. identity can be called. by linguistic
convention, the identity of the character [persomuige] ... the identity of the
character is constructed in connection with that of the plot" ( 1990: 168: l 992:
141 ).

This narrative tum has three major consequences. First, it cau~es the trans
formation of brute experiences, actions, and events into "sen-;e" or "mean
ing"; second. it dissociates fallibility (or guilt) from fragility, an association
that was central in Ful/ible Man: and, third. it inverts the relation bet\\een
ontology and ethics. While in Fallible Man ethics presupposed an ..ontology
of disproportion," "'ethics" takes precedence over any ontology of the self in
Oneself as Another.

Narrative Transformation of Brute Reality into Sense
Fallihle Man was an exercise in philosophical anthropology. focusing on that
which a human being is (essentially "fi,illihle"). Later on. Ricoeur came to
see that, because human being~ manife~t themselve~ through what they do.
a..:tion. for example, i~ not only where human beings can fail. but it is also
where they manifest who they are. Action thus reveals the field in which th e
human "essence" unfolds, as it were. and thereby decenters whatever essence
a human being may have by exporting it to the· public realm of interactions
with others. Action thus exposes who we are as human beings but not a~ 3
secondary moment originating from a preexisting ).elf. Rather. the decen!er·
ing of the human being~ through what they do means that they are not ~u 5I
an internal \lru..:rure made of voluntary and involuntary or a di~proportion.
but, llll)re fundamentally, they are a conne..:tion between "what" they do and
"who" they are.
.
With this externalization. a new tension arises between the action and 115
meaning. The meaning escapes agents because the action can be interpreted
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by others or by agents themselves at a later time. and the meaning includes
the consequences of the action, which may not have been inte.oded or antici
pated. 'The meaning of action separates itself from the event of acting [la
signification de /'action se detache de l'evenement de /'action]" (1986: t 9 I).
This new tension cannot be resorbed by a ''synthesis" that would take place
in e~istence in the static and psychological sense as in Fallible Man (through
respect. for example). The synthesis is itself a task to be accomplished or a
"work'' to be done, one that is of a narrative nature. The narrative will per
fonn the synthesis.
This narrative performance of a synthesis involves a combination of first
person and third-person perspectives. and consequently a combination of
the two temporalities pertaining to these perspectives. On the one hand, the
narrative is post facrum as a retrospective look. which synthesizes by giving
actions, experiences, or events a representation in the form of a story told "of'
those actions, experiences. or events. This preposition ··or• does not name a
relation of mirror image, copy. or duplication but a transformation from the
order of physical move.meats into meaning. Narratives give the "meaning'' of
the action, experie!1ce. or event. On the other hand. this movement of articula
tion by a narrative inse,rts the voice of the narrator (e.g., historians) into the
·•reality' of what is recounted. Hjstorical narratives, for example, bring what
took place back into a narrative presence but tbe meaning of the past is ''for"
historian . The narrative voice is thus a conflation of the temporality of the
third-per on and first-person perspectives. Let us see how this works.
A narrative provides a •·synthesis of the heterogeneous·• or a ''discordant
concordance ," in which either self. actions, or events are brought to a form of
Unity. By "synthesis of the heterogenous," Ricoeur explains. "I am attempt
ing to account for the diverse mediations performed by the plot: between tbe
manifold of events and the temporal unity of the story recounted.: between
the disparate components of the action-intentions. causes. and chance
occurrences-and the segue.nee of the story; and finally, between pure suc
cession and the unity of the temporal form" (1992: 141). At the level of
action. for example. an agent is not a self-contained subject. When acting we
also ..read," liter.ally, what others are doing or going to do. and we ourselves
follow some basic scripts. whether we are aware of them or not, so that our
&oals and movements are intellig.ible. Think of how bannonious the. behavior
of people in a restaurant is, roughly. abiding by some scenarios belonging
to lhi kind of environment. which would be very different in a church or
leccure hall. As Ricoeur shows. action ha~ a "semantics." a "symbolics,'' and
1 temporal structure.
The semantics of action is what transforms a set of gestures and move
ments into a "meaningful" whole that is recognizable as an action. Whenever
fie Change jobs. for example. we have to become familiar with the way other
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people work and what they expect us to tlo. We need to learn the implicit con
ceptual network that gives interactions their meaning, or their "semantics.'·
As Ricoeur writes, "our familiarity with the conceptual network of human
acting is of the same order a. the familiarity we have. with the plot s of stories
that are known to us" (1991b: 28). There is al u a "symbolics" of action. In
Ricoeur'. example. rai sing one's arm is used symbolic;ally by a person to
ura w attention. raise a question. stop a taxi. or vote. depending on the context.
"Symbols are the internal interpreters of action" ( I991 b: 29 ). Thi s holds true
not just for observer· who will find a ··readability" to action ( 199\b: 29> but
also for agents. who can then act .. meaningfully." Action abo has a tempo
ral structure and temporal features-beginning. end. transition between the
two-that give it a "pre-narrative quality" ( 1991 b: 29 l so that we can connect
gesture!> and mo ement~ in a specific sequence of what becomes an ··acci
tlent" of two people bumping into each other. or an .. attack," or a "reunion."
Because of the semantic, symbolic. and temporal structure of action. there
i~ a "connaturality" between the narrative of action and the action itself. By
making explicit the ··network'' already inherent in action (its goal. circum
,tances. and protagonists). the narrative neither ucics violence to the "texture"
of action nor is redundant of the action but gives its ··meaning." It is thus no
exaggeration to say that action is a "quasi-text" ( 1991 b: 29) or a "potential
story" ( 1986: 142). One can even say of one· s life that it is "'a story in its
nascent state," or that it is "in search of a narrative" ( 1991 b: 29). ~
As a resuh of thi s narrativization, experiences and actions are no longer
merely products of a subject-a cogiro. as Ricoeur calls it in the Philmophy
of the Will. Rather. they are al so a public manifestation of a person· s charac·
ter, of "who" that person is. Because my character in the psychological ense
is manifested in my deeds and actions. it i~ also manifested a~ the character
in rhe narrati ves I and others tell of myself. Thi · con~ation of character in
terms of p'.'>ychological trait~ and character as the narrativi -it protagonist in
actions and event ' gives me a readability so that people will Jecipher me
in my deeds and actions-from a third-person perspective-and ~ay thai_ I
"'remained true'' to myself or that I did something "out of character." This
readability repre. eots the constancy I ha e tlespite the variation ~ at 1he k\'~I
of -ameness as itlentity (idem) in age. appearance , anu activities. In. th1.~
!Sen. e. character become. for Ricoeur one model of "'permanence in ume
{besides keeping one' s word) ( 1992: 118). Thi;,, permanence in time is not
merely wh_at others , ay about me but lies in part in my 0\.\11 hand~ through
my ability to account for myself-from a tirst-persnn perspective-so th a!
"the permanence of character expres~es the ahmht complete mutual overla~
ping of the problematic of idem and ipse" ( I992: I 18). Narratives thus serv:
as a mediation between the third-person and first-person perspectives or. a~
Ricoeur puts it "between the pole of character, where idem and ipse te nd 10

From Fal/ibilil)· to Fragilil)

153

coincide, and the pole of self-maintenance, where selfbood frees it. elf from
sameness" (1992: 118-19).
R.icoeur describe t'hi " mediation as the fact that "character has a his
tory," which it "contracted"' .. in the twofold sense of the wore'! ·contraction':
abbreviati.on and affection. h is then comprehensible that the stable pole of
character can contain a narrative dimension. as we see in the uses of the term
'character· identifying it with the protagonist in a story. What sedimentation
has contracted. narration can redeploy" ( I 992: 122). That which sedimenta
tion has contracted is a "what": the subjects as narrated from a third-person
perspective (by themselves. and others). Narration can re-deploy a "who" in
the sen e that subjects can be narrator· of their own experiences and actions
from their first-person perspective or readers of narrative:-. involving them.
and usually both. ''The subject then appears both as a reader and the writer
[scripteur] of its own life, as Proust would have it. As the literary analysis
of autobiography confirms. the story of a me continues to be refigured by
all the truthful or fictive stories a subject tells about him elf or heLelf. This
refiguration makes this life itself a doth woven of stories told'' ( I988: 246).
In other words. our self-understanding is itself narrative-like in the ·ense
that we unde.rstand ourselves through the narratives we have read.~ This
combination of first-person and third-person perspectives explains that per
manence in time, which we have through our character. is itself a narrative
work of self-understanding and. as such, evolving. This is quite differe,ni
from Freedom and Nature where Ricoeur bad placed character under the
"absolute involuntary." along with the unconscious and life. At that time, as
Ricoeur says retrospectively. character belonged ''to that level of our exis
tence which we cannot change but to which we must consent'' ( 1992: 119). In
Fallible Man. a~ we saw. character is also immutable and inherited. But this
is precisely what Ricoeur rejects in Oneself as Another:

faatead of conceiving of charai:ter. in the framework of perspective and of open
ing, as the finite pole of existence [in Fallible Man]. I am interpreting it here in
1enns of its place in the problematic of identity. This shift of emphasis has as
iis principal. advantage the fact of putting into question the immutable status of
Character, taken for granted in the earlier analyse~ .. . Charal.'.ter. I would say
IDday. designate the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized.
ll992: 120--21 )1

Narrativization ace 1unt~ for the way in which we can be the co-authors of

our own lives oo the model of Aristotle' s notion of sunaition a. a co-cause
(1992: 160). We cannot be the sole author because we do nol have a direct
Dr intuitive acc:e " · 10 our self. Rather. the .elf is manifested in the hetero

ltleous (fact~. evenL , and so forth. which we cannot change). Yet, we are
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not merely a story because we perform the synthesis of the heterogeneous
and thereby bring concordance to what is discordant. As Ricoeur says, ··we
learn to become the narrator and the hero of our own story. without actually
becoming the author of our own life" ( 1991 b: 32). This is how narrati iLation
reconciles the third-person per. pective (from which we are a character in the
nan-ative~ told about ourselves) and the first-person perspective (from which
we are the author of those narratives,.
What was an "ontology of disproportion" in Freedom and Nawre in the
en e of a noncoincidenc.e. of human beings with themselves, which they "suf
fer." becomes a narrative task for human beings of making thi~ "di~cordance"
"concordant," and this mean . narrating it as a synthesis of the heterogenous
both on the side of experiences (actions and events) and on the side of self.
hood. "Gathering all these factors into a single story makes the plot a totality
which can be ~aid to be at once concordant and discordant (this is why I shall
-;peak of dj!>cordant concordance or of concordant discordance)" ( 1991 b: 21 ).
The narrative transformation of. first. actions into meaning~ and. second.
character in the p!>ychological en e into both a protagonist in actions or
events and the author of narrative'> conflate~ the "what"' we art' with the
"who'' we are. so that ..character is truly the ·what" of the 'who'" ( 1992:
122). Because the question of "who" we are always involves our tirst-person
perspective, thi s question cannot only pertain to a philosophil'al anthropology
as in Fallihle Man. This brings us to the second consequence of the narrative
turn. for example, that there cannot be a strictly third-per~on perspective from
which fallibility can be said to be '\.:onstitutive·· of human beings.
Narrative Transformation of Fallibility into Fragility

We ~aw in the previous section that the ··•disproportion· of ~elf to ~elf' wa,
unc..ler 'tood negatively in /·al/ib!t· Man as a "primordial discord"' 11960a: 148:
1986: 202) or a "the ratio of fallibility '' ( 1960a: 21: J986: 4 ). Ricoeur speaks
alternatively of fallibility and fragility. and eems to equate tht:rn mo~t ti rhe
time a the ·usceptibility ur inclination to have a bad will or doing evil. 1 In his
"lnte.llectual Autobiography" ( 1995 J he criticizes this unilaterality in Fal~i~le
Mtm and recognizes the need to differentiate fallibility (or guilt land fragility
(or vulnerability I.
I had to work out the ontology of finite "ill implil·it in thL' <.lialeL·tk of aclin.!!
and suffering. Tll this ontology. I ga\'C the \el)' Pa,l·alian nam~ of an ontolog)
of <.li~pmportion. Human frailty. our vulm:rability to mornl evil. wnulJ he nolb·
ing other than a con titutivc di~proponion between a pole of the intinil_~ an~~
pole of the finite. To my mind. the mo~, original frawre of this meJ11a11on .,,,a.
1101 so mm:h the idea of disproponion as the l·haracter of frailty a11.11:hing to the
mediation~ inter~persed between the opposing role~. I 1995: 15)
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The significant difference between fallibility and fragility (or vulnerabil
ity), in my view, lies in the focu s of the approach . Fallibility is what a static
third-person approach finds in describing human beings by "faulting" them,
literally, for what they lack. Fragility (or vulnerability is what a dynamic
approach finds in accounting for the first-person perspective of what human
beings live and experience. In other words. once the manifestation of human
existence is een as belonging to existence itself. once "being" is extende,d to
"acting and suffering among others." the "what''-question-"what are human
beings?"-<.:annot be separated from the "who" -question-''Who am I in my
deeds and actions?" The recognition that human beings manifest themselves
in what they do brings the negative side of a "capacity to fail' ' back into a
positive condition of being fragile and vulnerable. As a consequence, the
"disproportion" can no longer be just a fact that is ·'constitutive" of being
human, that is. an ontological fact or a facticity and, accordingly. our vul
nerability can no longer be a fa ctum as fa1libility. Rather. this fragility and
vulnerability lie in the fact that we are not the masters of the meaning of what
is experienced and done but are open and exposed to being narrated. embed
ded in plot , or, alternatively. unable to bring to concordance what happened
to us.
What provides the positive aspect of fragility and vulnerability is the narra
tive voice of the first-person perspective. It is no longer facts and events that
confront us but their sense or meaning (this was the first transformation oper
ated by the narrative turn). Rather. actions and events are looked at retrospec
tively. and in this retrospective look a voice is also lent to those actions and
events. For example, the "past." which in one ense "was" before me. is such
only because I give it a voice. Once I tell a narrative about myself. I am split.
We already mentioned the split between author and character. The new split
here is between the present of the perfonmmce of telling the story and the
past of what is narrated-for example, my past. The narrative voice integrates
these two dimensions of te.mporality into one: the present of t.he narration. It
may be that actions were performed in the past, but it is in the present of the
narration that the past of those actions gains its meaning.
·
While the "voice" comes after the experiences. facts. or events. and is
mine, I lent this voice to those experiences. facts, and events so that they
Pin presence.9 The present of my voice i:,, also a gift to the past. offering it
retrospectively a new present. The narrative voice is the very manifestation
of my frdgility . precisely because through my narratives I recognize the ante
cedent voice of what escapes my power-in the form of past experiences,
facts. and events. Thus "the narrative voice," Ricoeur says, "is neither that
Of memory nor that of historiography," which would be from a third-person
Ptrspective, ''but that which resu Its from the relation of the posteriority of the
llln'ltive voice in relation to the story it tells" (l985a: 98-99). that is from a
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first-person perspective. The presence of my voice in giving a pre ·ent to what
happened means that narratives have an e.thical valence because they include
the exi tential attitude of those who give the narratives and this attitude is one
of respon,e. If historians give u-: new accounts it is because, in some sen~e.
they "respond'' to that which called upon them to be told. ThL leads to the
third transformation caused by the theory of narrative.

Narrative Transformation of Ontology into Et.hies
The anthropology of human beings in Fallible Man could tart with a tradi•
tional ontology of suhstance even if it were amended to include the .. involun
tary.'' as that which chaUenges the will from within, or if it were amended to
include the possibility for the will to become "bad will.'' People are ontologi•
cally-in their "rnnstitution''-fallihle. They are first and foremost those who
have "missed the mark'' ( I960a: 159; 1986a: 218 ), a Ricoeur evocatively
says. This expression "missing the mark" is what the Greek term hunwrria
mean:-.. as a tem1 of archery. It is a ·'mistake." hut the term wa, used to name
the terrible ·•mistake" at the heart of a tragedy. such as Oedipm·s deed. It
was then used later in the Gospels to name. that which has been tram,lated a~
"sin" in English. 111 The "mistake" in question is thus not merely of a psycho
logical orde.r but an ontological di ,order or a tear in the fahri<.: of the world.
Such was Ricoeur' s starting point in Fallible Man where human beings are
fallen. "bewildered and lost,'' and have "forgotten the origin'' ( 1960a: 159:
1986a: 219). In su<.:h a world. Ricoeur ominously said, ..ethic:-. arrive~ too
late .. ( 1960a: 159; 1986a: 219 ).
Once narrative transfom1s subjects into t.:haracters. narrators. or interpret·
ers. the relation of priority between ontology and ethic, ~hiftll. As we have
seen. reality (actions, events, self) has heen transformed into meaning :,,o 1hat
agents (or subjects in general) have the role of interpreters of actions. events.
and their own life. Because we cannot go back to what "really'' happened
and confront reality "face to face." a. it were. experience!-.. actions. or events
receive their ontological weight retrospectively: through their "readabilit(
or "interpretability" and thus from their pre~entations anJ descriptions tn
narrative·.
This readability of action ha:-. a liberating effect again, t the brutality 0.~
action or evenb in the sen e that they can be rernunted-"present~d:
"described." that is. "narrated"-in different ways. As Rkoeur notes. ··it ,~
always possible ... to narrate differently" (2004b: 157: 200~c: 1041. The
. ,. can be mo d.h
··sen~e .. or ·· meaning
1 , ed or c hange d . Tl.
11s· 1·s what allow~
.
•
.
.
.
.
d · I . brutahtv of
R1coeur to say 111 Memory, H~.Hory. Forg~t~1~g th~t. .. e~p1te, t 1e
.. Yet.
events in the past, there remam. the poss1b1ltty ot a happ) memory.. e
besides the liberating effect of a transformation into meaning. there ts th
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correlative danger of narrative idealism. which would de-realize actions an.d
events, and merely dramatize them. Ricoeur is keenly aware of this danger
of heterogeneity between the sense or meaning of the action or the ·,ev,e nt
on one side. and its .. reality," on the o,ther. ''If the ·sense-content' is wha,t
makes possible the 'inscription' of the action-event U'evenemnt d'action],
what makes it real'? In other words, what corresponds to writing in the fietd
of action?" (1986: 193; 1991c: 152). We need a guarantee ithac the narrative
is truth-telling and not a fabrication.
Narratives have two valences, one with regard to their object and one with
regard to their author. In their first valence, narrat,ives claim ,to render the
ani.culation and thus the meaning of the action itself so that narratives ·reach
a level of "representation" that can claim to be a fe-,presentation of the acition
itself. Thi is wbat historians do. Although they t,eH us stories, these stories
are ''true" and any competitor to a historical narrative wilil lbe another histori
cal narrative. The second valence of narratives is on the side of t'heir authors .
The guarantee that narratives are ·•of' ex periences. actions. and events. and
not merely fabricat~d. lies in the existentia''l aui,tude of those who prnvide ,t'he
narrative. This existential attitude keeps the meaning connected to the actions
or events recounted and avoids a narrative idealism that would dispense with
the "reality" of what "really happened ."
Rkoeur has described thi s existential at1ti,tude of those who g,ive the narra
tives in two ways. The first one is a ''debt ' that we have to "r,ender" w1hat took
place because the past or what happened is demanding to be recounted. His
torians, Ricoeur says, .. are all moved by the desire to do justic,e to the pas.t"
because they as well as their readers have •;an unpaid debt'' ( 1985b: 273;
1988: 152). Ricoeur acknowledges that this notion of debt is "strange" but
he finds it implied in the expression used by historians and paint,ers: "They
seek to 'render· something, a landscape or a course of ever,its. In th is term 'to
tender,' I see the desire to ·render its due' to what is and to what once was•·
0985b: 273; 1988: 152). The debt that is felt results from a duty to respond to
1 call coming from wbat asked to be narrated. "We ,tell stories because ir,i the
last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated . This remark ,takes on
ila full force when we refer to the necessity to save the history of the defeated
and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance anti cal.ls
for narrative [appe/le recitl" ( J983: 143: J 9,84: 75). This make. historians
"insolvent debtors'' (1985b: 253: 1988: 143 ).
.The second way Ricoeur describes the existential attitude of t1hose wbo
~e narrative, is attestation . He applied this notion first to the self. Atte.sta
lioo is linked to the ··1 can'' and is a confirmation or an er,i dorsement of 1this
'\ang capable '. "Anestation is tbe sort of confidence or assurance ( nondox.ic
'Pilleinological status) that each of us has of existing (ontological status) ,or,i
anode of self (phenomenological status)" (I 991 a: 382. My translation). 11
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In Memory. History, Forgerring Ricoeur extends the notion of attestation to
that which I am capable of and conne.cts it to the narratives histori,u1 give.
By giving a narrative. historians ··attest" to their own ethical stance. The
belief in historians-the trust we have in them-redoubles the truth of the
statement-we believe that their hi storical narrative are true. 11 Attestation is
thus productive of truth at two level. and at the . ame time. A:- endor ing my
own capability it is an "alethic mode" (mode alethique [ou veritat(fl>-here I
am. as a truth-teller-and as accompanying my "tatement it is an "epi~temic
mode of a:-sertions" {2004b: 140; 2004c: 9 I ) that makes the historic.ii account
an '"attestation to reality" (atteJtation de realite) (2000: 363: 2004a: 178).
Far from being extrinsic to the narrative. the existential attitude of histmi
ans belongs to the narrative "voice" that retrospectively gives an ontological
status to whut i~ recounted. and it can perform this remarkable feat through
the voice's credence and. thus. through its ethical status. By pre~enting a
narrative of what took place. author~. such a · historians. attest 10 their moral
status as tmthful and trustwonhy storytellers. Ethics, which arri\'ed 100 late
according to Fallible Man. becomes prominent after the narrati ve turn insofar
as ethic:,, gives narratives their valence as "true representation:-." of what has
taken place.
The different transformations performed by the theory of narrative tof
reality into meaning, fallibility into fragility , ontology into ethil.:s) find a
remarkable outcome in making it po~:-.ible for memory-for example. the
memory of a horrific past-to bt:come a "happy memory." Thi\ is the title
of the ··Epilogue·· of Memory. Hi.van. Forgetting. I cannot di~cus:,, this here
except to point out the extent to which the notion of happinc::.- , from Fallible
Man ha,; also changed along with that of d1aracter. In the early work. happi•
nes~ i:,, a ·•oisproponion" at the practical level as the totality that regulates (in
a Kantian seme) the way in which an individual. with limited acces~ tn the
world (through character). is a person open to humanity ( with its aims and
possibilities). Happiness wa:s not a feeling. It belonged 10 a transcendent~~ ,
framework as an ideal although it was an ideal that kept human being~ ··ro~
and in "discord." By contrast. in Memory. History. Forgerting, happiness 15
no longer the opposite pole of character but. in fact, the succe$~ of the na~a·
ti ve work once we have accepted. first. that the past mauers in the meaning
it has for the present-this is what the narrative ,•oice accompli,;hes: seco nd ·
that our psychologkal traits ,ire manifested and pre:,,ented in narrative~ so th at
we are. even as historians. protagonists in our narrative~: .ind. third. that any
ontology depends on our ethical altitude.
.
Ricoeur himself draws an analogy between Memory. History, Forgettm~
. . H. la ·t work
and Preedom and Nature with regard to the treatment of _gu1_1t. 1' . work,
is a phenomenology of memory in the same way that h1~ tirst maJor h
.
h rks t e
Freedom and Nature. was a phenomenology of the will. In bot wo ·

From Fallibili0· ro Fragility

159

questioo of guilt or fault had to be provisionally bracketed. Just as Fallible
Mm, examined th.is question of guilt that had been "bracketed" in Freedom
and Nature. like.wise the ''Epilogue" to Memory, History, Forgetting is
about guilt, which had beeo bracketed in the main part of the work. Guilt is
approached in tbe "epilogue '' from the perspective of its cleansing or "forget
ting." which is forgiveness. Forgiveness is not a forgetting of what happened.
but rather a. transformation of the ·ense or meaning of what happened. espe
cially with regard to victims and perpetrators. Thjs transformation through
forgetting and forgiveness is precisely what na.rrati ves cao do. Of necessity.
narratives are selective, and of necessity other ways of narrating the "same"
event are possible. This possibility of re-articulating painful events, of bring
ing into discussions different perspectives does not ddete what happened but
provides a broader readability of what happened. This broader readability
can bring past enemies or descendants of perpetrator<; into the discussion.
If forgiveae, s can play a role in history-Ricoeur is ambivalent about it-it
would not be merely a private psychological event that might allo\ victim.
and perpetrators (or their descendants ) to move on. In Ricoeur's narrative
framework, forgiveness has the power to chaoge the meaning of the past so
that human beings may be reconciled with what took place and find peace
with themselves and former perpetrators in a happy memory.
Ir indeed facts are indebble [ineffarabtes]. if what has been dooe cannot be

undone and if we cannot make it the case that what ha happened has not, by
contrast, the sen e of what has happened is not fixed once and for all. Besides
the fact that the events of the past can be interpreted otherwise. the moral
burden associated with the debt 1oward the past can be increased or alleviated
depending on whether the accu .. ation contioes the guilty individual in the pain•
ful feeling of the irreversible or whether forgiveness opens the perspective of a
delh·eranc.e from the debt. which amounts to a conversion of the very sense of
die event. (Ricoeur 1998: 29)

Stith a "happ., memory" as the result of a narrative work could resorb the
..dilproponion ' left jarring in Fallible Man and "restore'' the integrity of the
human being which was the elusive goal of the Philosophy of the Will.

NOTES
l. As Ricoeur insists, "guilt i!, not synonymous with foul!" ( I 960b: 99; 196?:
UII). Culpability or fallibility name an (m~ological component of human existence or
Gflllc human condition whereas fault i~ an instantiation of such a capacity !O fail.
l. Fallibility is thus "the constitutional weakness which makes evil possible"

't6oa: 11; 1986a: xix).
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3. In Freedom anJ Na111re he speaks of "my freedom· s mode of being Ila maniere
d·ecre de 11w liberre]" l 1950: 345: I%6: 368).
4. Happiness is Ihm; not simply plea ure. and remarkably nol a "feeling.'' a~
Ricoeur understands feeling in Fallihle Man. Rather. ii is eudaimu11ia or heatituJc. as
the life of a person, which can be saiJ retrospectively to hav_e hccn a good life.
5. Narratiw is thw .. the text par excellence" ( I 995: 29).
In Time and Narrative Ricocur speaks of a triple mimesis in orJcr Lo sht1w the
interactions between (I) the worlJ of experiences as a pre-figuration in the sen~e of
having a prc-narrati ve nature (Mimesis I): (2) the actual narratives as a l'onfigurJtion
of the world of experience (Mimesis2); anJ (3) the effel't al·tual narrative~ huvc tJn the
world of experienl~e when subject and agents u1,c what they have reaJ anJ •·re-tigure"
the world of experience and action (Mimesis3). On this. sec Vandevelde 200X. '.!013.
6. As Ricocur eii:plains. "it therefore seem. plau.ihle 10 take the following chain
of assertions as valid: self-understanding is an interpretation; intcrpr.elation of chc :,elf.
in tum. find s in the. narrali\'c, among other signs and symbols. a privilq;ed form of
mediation; the laner borrows from hiscory a~ well as from fiction. making a life story a
til'lional history ur. if nne prefers, a historical fiction. interweaving t'hc hi,toriogrnphic
scylc of hiographic~ with the novelistic style of imaginary autobiogrnphie~" f 1992:
114).
Sec also: "My the),is is here that the prnl'ess of composition. of cnnhguration,
is nut comple1eJ in the text hut in the reader anJ, unJer this conclitinn. make~ pos
~ible the reconfiguration of life hy narrative. I should say. mor~· precisely: the sen~c
or che significance of a narrative stems frnm the inrersecrion ,f the u or/J tf 1he text
anc/ the ll'urld of the reader. The act of reading thu become ' the critic.ii mnrncm of
the entire analysis. On it re~ts the narrative· s capacity LO lrnnsfigure the cx.pericm.:e of
the reader .. ( 1991 h: 26 ).
7. ln f1lotnotc. he say~: •·character. I would say today. is sameness in mincnes~-
( 1992: 120).
8. Rirneur says: 'The 'disproportion· whose e:1;cgesis we have hccn pursuing
1hruugh knowing. acting and feeling. take" on the name of fragility in the affccti\c:
l)rJer" ( 196(la: 142: 1986a: 191 ).
9. A~ Riaieur asks. "cnulJ we nnt sav that the preterite Inf the narration] pre
serve~ its grammatical form and its pri vikgc because the present of narratinn h
unJeNuoJ hy the reaJer as posterior to the narrated story. hence 'that the told ~tol)'
is the past of the narrative mice? ls not cYery story in the pa!->I for 1thc voice that tells
it?" ( 1985a: 98 ).
10. Sec also Rkoeur 1960?: _7-l; 1967: 72.
.
.• . ied
11. As R1coeur dc,cnbc, 11 m One.w:U as Another. ··auc~tat1on can h~ 1dcnut_
with the a,-~ural1Cl' that cal:h person has of cxi,ting as thi:: s:.irnc in the sense of ipsei~y.
M.!llhonJ" ( 1990: 346; 1992: 298). We tinJ unalogou, f11rmula1inn in Mem 11 0': His·
tory, For,<ettill!!,: ··what I expect from my clo~c relations is th.:it they appnwc '.)~ w~t
I alh::-t: that [ am ahlc l\l \peak, act. rccounl. impute to my~elf the respon,ihilitY ur
rny actions" (20(X}: 162; 2004a: l 32).
. h1
12. [f 1:hallenged, hi,torian~ will allcst to thl!ir ethical stunce anui tlw Lru th 01 w a
they say by exhihiting the document, useJ anJ presenting the eixplanaiory
Jure), employed. ''It is together that ~cripturality. comprehensive cxplanauon. ~

r~:~
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documentary proof are capable of accrediting the truth claim or historical discourse.
Only the movement that moves back. from the art of writing to the 'research tech•
niques· and 'critical procedures· is capable of raising t.he prNest to the rank of what
ha.s become a cri1ical auestation" (2000: 363-64: 2004a: 278).
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